Market structure and inflation differentials in the European monetary union by Andrés Domingo, Javier Angel et al.
DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO
MARKET STRUCTURE
AND INFLATION
DIFFERENTIALS IN
THE EUROPEAN
MONETARY UNION
Documento de Trabajo n.º 0301
Eva Ortega and Javier Vallés
BANCO DE ESPAÑA
SERVICIO DE ESTUDIOS
Javier Andrés,
MARKET STRUCTURE 
AND INFLATION 
DIFFERENTIALS IN 
THE EUROPEAN 
MONETARY UNION (*) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Documento de Trabajo nº 0301 
 
 
Javier Andrés 
UNIVERSIDAD DE VALENCIA AND BANCO DE ESPAÑA 
 
 
Eva Ortega and Javier Vallés 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(*)We thank the comments by Matt Canzoneri, Behzad Diba, Jordi Gali, David López-Salido, Fernando 
Restoy, Christoph Thoenissen, an anonymous referee and seminar participants at the Banco de España, 
Bank of England, 7th meeting of the LACEA and XVII Simposio de Análisis Económico. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and finance. All papers 
have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute 
to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international 
environment. 
 
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, 
therefore, do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
 
 
 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most 
of its publications via the INTERNET at the following 
 website: http://www.bde.es 
 
 
 
© Banco de España, Madrid, 2003 
 
ISSN: 0213-2710 (print) 
ISSN: 1579-8666 (online) 
Depósito legal: M. 19713-2003
Imprenta del Banco de España  
Abstract
In a monetary union, inflation rate differentials may be substantial over
the business cycle. This paper parameterizes a two-country monetary union
in which different economic structures in the two countries generate tem-
porary inflation differentials. Cross-country differences are introduced in
(i) the elasticity of demand in the goods markets, which cause producers
to discriminate prices, (ii) the degree price inertia and (iii) openness or
preference for foreign goods in consumption. The model is calibrated to
reproduce two average big EMU countries and it is able to generate size-
able inflation differentials. We find the mechanism of price discrimination
quantitatively more important than the differences in price inertia. More-
over, under asymmetric shocks, differences in the degree of openness as the
ones observed within the EMU can have sizeable effects on the dispersion
of inflation rates.
1. Introduction
Changes in relative prices in a monetary union, i.e. inflation differentials, may
not disappear despite the fixed exchange rate. In September 2002 the difference
between the maximum and the minimum HICP inflation rate in the euro area
countries was about 3.5 percentage points. Indeed the dispersion, measured as
the standard deviation of the inflation rates across euro area countries, is around
1 per cent and has remained very persistent since the beginning of EMU in spite
of the changes in the level of inflation (see Figure 1).
Observed inflation differentials can be due to the convergence processes en-
hanced by economic integration that vanish in the long run, such as conver-
gence in price levels associated with productivity catching-up (the Balassa(1964)-
Samuelson(1964) effect) and income levels convergence. Nevertheless, empirical
evidence (see Rogers, 2002) shows that during the nineties factors other than price
convergence explain most of the cross-country inflation differences in Europe.1
In the present paper, we analyze potential sources of inflation differentials
among members of a monetary union beyond those associated with income and
price convergence. Differences in economic structures, such as the degree of com-
petition, openness or the intensity of nominal inertia, may also generate cross-
country inflation differentials even in response to common shocks. We explore
this alternative explanation to account for the EMU evidence. Our aim is to
explain inflation differentials that are relevant at business cycle frequencies and,
therefore, we focus on the differential of the short run response of inflation to
shocks across countries. To that end, we set up a simple general equilibrium
model of a two-country monetary union, calibrated to mimic the features of rep-
resentative European economies. We perform simulation exercises to analyze the
effects of common and asymmetric shocks, for alternative values of some crucial
parameters of the model. Our work is akin to Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan’s
1Country case studies (see Estrada and Lopez Salido, 2002, for Spain) and Euro area com-
parisons for the largest economies (Ortega, 2003) also show that during the years prior to EMU
convergence processes such as the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis have not necessarily been the
major factor behind the changes in relative prices across countries.
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(2001), who look at the persistence and volatility of deviations from the law of
one price among tradeable goods between US and Europe and Bergin (2001), who
studies the deviations from purchasing power parity in a monetary union.2
The economics of inflation differentials in this model is simple: inflation reacts
faster in countries with more competitive markets and with lower price adjustment
costs. This simple structure is able to generate substantial inflation differentials
for reasonable parameter values. Small deviations in the degree of competition
that account for 5 per cent long run price level difference across countries may be
responsible for temporary inflation differentials of up to 28 basis points when the
economy is subject to a common monetary policy shock. That may represent up
to one fourth of the actual inflation dispersion in the euro area countries. More-
over, cross-country realistic differences in the degree of nominal inertia and/or in
openness also contribute to generate substantial inflation differentials in presence
of regional shocks. For example, if the domestic country is very open its inflation
rate may respond even more than the foreign inflation rate to shocks originating
abroad, depending of the type of disturbance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model. The calibra-
tion, in section 3, reproduces some long-term features in the European economy.
Section 4 contains the main results of the paper that are presented in terms of
impulse responses and of alternative price dispersion statistics. These are calcu-
lated under common and asymmetric shocks as well as under alternative values
for the relevant parameters. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
The model is a fixed exchange rate version of Obstfeld and Rogoff’s (1995) in which
the world is composed of two countries with a common monetary authority. The
model incorporates two special features.
2Unlike Bergin (2001), who uses translog preferences, we stick to a CES specification of
consumption goods with firms facing different elasticities of demand across countries.
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First, all goods are tradeable. We are aware that inflation in the traded sector
across Euro area countries is significantly lower than in the non-traded one. In
September 2002, the difference between the maximum and the minimum HICP
inflation rate for non-energy industrial goods was of 2.85 percentage points, while
it was 5.20 percentage points for services. If sizeable inflation differentials emerge
for reasonable parameterizations of shocks and economic structures across EMU
countries in this model, then we should expect that those same shocks and struc-
tures would generate higher inflation differentials when considering the non-traded
sector. In a sense, we are aiming at modeling and quantifying a lower bound for
inflation differentials in EMU at business cycle frequencies. In fact, as shown
in Figure 1, the actual inflation dispersion of industrial (non-energetic) goods is
somewhat lower adn as persistent as the ones observed with the overall HICP.
Second, the model allows for heterogeneity of market power across countries
that tries to capture institutional and regulatory differences as well as different
preferences for the variety of goods within the monetary union. This generates
optimal price discrimination by firms and will cause permanent deviations of the
law of one price.3
The empirical motivation for this key property of the model is the observation
that although there has been a significant price convergence process across Euro-
pean countries, deviations from the law of one price remain large and persistent
among EMU countries both for specific goods (Goldberg and Verboven, 2001, for
the car industry) and for a basket of goods (Rogers, 2002); this also occurs among
cities and regions in well established monetary unions (see, for example, Cecchetti,
Mark and Sonora, 2000, for the US).
2.1. Market Structure
Let us consider a world of two countries: Home (H) and Foreign (F ). Agents
populating country H are indexed by j (j ∈ [0, 1]), each of whom produces a
3An alternative to price discrimination discussed recently by the literature is that the traded
sector contains a large share of non-traded intermediate inputs, such as transport, storage and
communication (e.g. Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2000), Corsetti and Dedola (2001)).
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variety of one type of tradeable intermediate good (yt(j)) in which the country
is specialized. Each agent sells part of her production in the domestic market
(yH,t(j)) and the rest in the foreign market (y∗H,t(j) = yt(j)− yH,t(j)); she enjoys
some monopolistic power both at home and abroad.
Either due to different regulations or preferences, the elasticity of substitution
among brands is different across countries. The elasticity of substitution is coun-
try specific, but not product specific and takes the value of θ for those varieties
sold in H, and θ∗ for those sold in F . Thus, producers can discriminate prices
across countries, and they optimally do so. Neither consumers are not allowed to
arbitrage across markets nor firms’ entry and exit are permitted in domestic or
foreign markets.
In each country there is a sector of final goods selling products at home and
abroad (exports). This sector is represented by two CES aggregators. Aggregator
H buys varieties produced in the domestic country (yH,t(j)) and sells a composite
product to home consumers. These varieties are imperfect substitutes in consumer
preferences:
yHt =
Z 1
0
³
yH,t(j)
θ−1
θ dj
´ θ
θ−1
The demand function for each variety derived from the aggregator problem is the
following
yH,t(j) = yH,t
Ã
PH,t(j)
PH,t
!−θ
(2.1)
and, imposing the zero profit condition, the utility-based price index is given
by PH,t =
R 1
0
³
PH,t(j)
1−θdj
´ 1
1−θ . Similar relationships are obtained for the home
aggregator of y∗H,t (exports) and for the aggregators for country F : y
∗
F,t for foreign
domestic consumption and yF,t for foreign exports (to the H country)
2.2. Preferences and price formation
Agent j sells her own variety of intermediate goods produced at home and abroad,
and uses the revenues to consume both domestic and foreign goods. She will seek
10
to maximize the utility of consumption and minimize the disutility of production.4
The consumption basket is represented by the CES aggregator,
ct(j) = [ωH,t (cH,t(j))ρ + ωF,t (cF,t(j))ρ]
1
ρ
where cH,t(j) is the consumption byH residents ofH produced goods, cF,t(j) is the
consumption by H residents of F produced goods, ωH and ωF are their respective
trade-based weights in the consumption bundle and ε = 1
1−ρ is the elasticity of
substitution among both goods. The more open the economy the larger the share
of foreign goods in the consumption basket, i.e. higher ωFωH , and the higher the
elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.
Agent j also sells her output in monopolistically competitive markets: she
sets the nominal price, PH,t(j) and P ∗H,t(j), subject to the requirement that it
satisfies the demand for final goods. Moreover, the agent faces a quadratic cost
of adjusting prices (as in Rotemberg, 1982).
The constrained maximization program of the home producer-consumer agent
j consists therefore of maximizing her lifetime utility,
Ut(j) = Et
∞X
t=0
βtst
"
ct(j)
1−σ
1− σ −
[yt(j)vt]
α
α
#
(2.2)
subject to
At(j) + PH,tcH,t(j) + PF,tcF,t(j) + PH,tACH,t(j) + P
∗
H,tAC
∗
H,t(j)
≤ (rt−1 − ψ (eat−1 − 1))At−1(j) + PH,t(j)yH,t(j) + P ∗H,t(j)y∗H,t(j)
and the demand functions (2.1) (along with the corresponding demands for y∗H,t(j
∗)),
where st is a preference shock, vt is an innovation to the disutility of production
that stands by a negative supply shock, and
4Since we focus on price dynamics we abstract from the labor market and we choose to
feature the representative agents as yeoman farmers, simultaneously engaged in consumption
and production. Woodford (2002) shows that the equilibrium in this economy is the same as
one in which the representative agent decides her labor supply and where the labor market is
competitive.
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ACH,t(j) =
φyH,t
2
Ã
PH,t(j)
PH,t−1(j)
− π¯
!2
(2.3)
AC∗H,t(j) =
φy∗H,t
2
Ã
P ∗H,t(j)
P ∗H,t−1(j)
− π¯
!2
(2.4)
represent the costs of adjusting prices in each market expressed in units of the
aggregate bundle, scaled by a country specific factor φ.5 This convex cost func-
tion is just an abstraction and tries to represent the variety of reasons why a firm
decides not to change its price instantaneously at each period. That cost func-
tion generates similar dynamic implications that the alternative specification of
staggered prices but it has no long-run implications for inflation.
At is the nominal amount held by residents in H of an uncontingent interna-
tional bond that yields a nominal gross return rt in the world financial market.
We include the function ψt = ψ (eat − 1) to represent a transaction cost of holding
assets. The cost function depends on the ratio of asset holdings to consumption
(i.e. at = AtPtct ) such that if the household is a lender, her returns are reduced
by the amount of the cost (−ψ (eat − 1) < 0), conversely, if the household is a
net borrower, then interest payments are increased by (−ψ (eat − 1) > 0). This
transaction costs function guarantees that the model is stationary in presence of
transitory shocks.6
A similar problem holds for the foreign representative household, j∗, where
c∗F,t(j
∗) is the consumption by F residents of F produced goods and c∗H,t(j
∗) is the
consumption by F residents of H produced goods. The scale factor for the costs
of adjusting prices in the foreign country is φ∗, which allows for exploring the
5It is more consistent with the individual firm’s problem to define the cost function in terms
of individual forgone output instead of the aggregate output. Nevertheless to do this it would
only generate more complex dynamics of the firm’s optimal price equation so we prefer the
standard way followed in the macro literature.
6See Benigno (2001). Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2001) explore alternative ways to remove
non-stationarity in open economy models with incomplete markets, stemming from the ac-
cumulation of foreign assets, and find that all produce similar conditional and unconditional
correlations.
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implications of different degrees of price stickiness in different countries in as long
as φ∗ differs from φ. Foreign agents face also a similar transaction cost function.
The following aggregate goods market clearing condition is imposed for yHt
Z 1
0
cH,t(j)dj +
Z 1
0
ACH,t(j)dj = cH,t +ACH,t = yH,t (2.5)
and similar ones for the exports market, y∗Ht, the foreign domestic goods market,
y∗Ft, and foreign exports market, yFt.
The model is closed with the specification of the balance of payments and the
common monetary policy. The balance of payments constraints in both countries
are expressed as:7
P ∗H,tc
∗
H,t + (rt−1 − ψ (eat−1 − 1))At−1 − PF,tcF,t = At (2.6)
At = −A∗t (2.7)
The common monetary policy is modeled as a standard Taylor interest rate
rule where the central bank cares only for inflation. The monetary authority
sets the nominal interest rate to prevent deviations of aggregate inflation from its
steady state value, and to ensure that the nominal interest rate moves smoothly.
Both countries are assumed to have equal size and therefore the weight of each
country’s variable is 1
2
.8 In log-linear form, the rule is represented by the following
expression, in which zr,t represents unexpected monetary policy changes,
brt = ρrbrt−1 + (1− ρr)ρπ 12 (bπt + bπ∗t ) + zr,t. (2.8)
7To rationalise the existence of transaction costs we assume that there is a financial intermedi-
ary that gets those payments as revenues in exchange for the services of financial intermediation.
Further, we assume that this financial firm is owned by residents of the foreign country so that
total revenues for the foreign consumer budget constraint are augmented by
£
ψ∗tA∗t−1 + ψtAt−1
¤
.
8This kind of monetary policy rule may not approximate the optimal policy, especially when
the degree of price rigidity differs across countries (see Benigno and López-Salido (2002)).
13
2.3. Equilibrium inflation dynamics
The log-linear version of the symmetric monopolistic equilibrium is summarized in
the Appendix.9 It is obtained upon aggregation of the first order conditions of the
representative consumer-producer agents at home and abroad, the market clearing
conditions, the monetary policy rule and the balance of payments constraints in
both countries.
The domestic aggregate consumption price index depends on the home-bias,
measured by the weight of consumption of domestic goods (ωH) relative to weight
of imported goods (ωF ), and on the elasticity of substitution parameter (ρ),
bPt = (ωH)( 11−ρ )
Ã
PH
P
!( ρρ−1) ³ bPH,t´+ (ωF )( 11−ρ )
Ã
PF
P
!( ρρ−1) ³ bPF,t´ (2.9)
and an equivalent expression holds for the foreign country price index P ∗t .
Since our aim is to explain the inflation differentials at business cycle frequen-
cies, we need to pay special attention to the two aggregate inflation equations:
bπt = βEbπt+1 + τ(θ − 1)φπ¯2
" bdt + (1− τ)φτφ∗
³ bd∗t + ³ bP ∗Ft − bPFt´´
#
(2.10)
bπ∗t = βEbπ∗t+1 + (1− τ ∗)(θ∗ − 1)φ∗π¯2
" bd∗t + τ∗φ∗(1− τ ∗)φ
³ bdt + ³ bPHt − bP ∗Ht´´
#
(2.11)
where (1−τ)τ =
³
ωF
ωH
´( 1
1−ρ ), τ
∗
(1−τ∗) =
µ
ω∗H
ω∗F
¶( 1
1−ρ )
and
bdt = σbct + (α− 1)byt + ωF
(1− ρ)
µ
cF
c
¶ρ ³ bPF,t − bPH,t´+ αbvt
bd∗t = σbc∗t + (α− 1)by∗t + ω∗H(1− ρ)
µ
cH
c
¶ρ ³ bP ∗H,t − bP ∗F,t´+ αbv∗t
9Variables withb represent log-deviations with respect to their steady state value, whereas
at and a∗t are expressed in absolute deviations from the steady state.
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These expressions are straightforward extensions of the standard closed econ-
omy new Keynesian Phillips curve.10 Thus, bdt represents the open economy equiv-
alent to the domestic real marginal cost of production in the yeoman farmer econ-
omy as defined by Woodford (2002), i.e. the marginal disutility of production
in units of an equivalent quantity of the consumption aggregate. Similarly, bd∗t
represents the real marginal cost in the foreign economy. Domestic and foreign
real marginal costs affect domestic inflation through their effect upon bπH,t andbπF,t respectively. Since the disutility of production is measured in terms of a
consumption aggregate that includes imported goods, the marginal cost depends
on relative prices. Improvements in the terms of trade, ( bPF,t − bPH,t), increase
the domestic marginal cost by inducing a substitution away from foreign to home
produced goods. Similarly, bπF,t responds to ( bP ∗H,t − bP ∗F,t). An additional term
in our model, ( bP ∗Ft − bPFt), captures the effect of price discrimination. Increases
in bP ∗Ft relative to bPFt generates a wealth transfer from the foreign to the home
country that also rises the implicit wage and the marginal cost at home.
In an two-country world, this simple structure makes it also possible to rep-
resent the incidence of the price setting mechanism in the dynamics of inflation
differentials through the elasticities of demand (θ, θ∗) as well as through the price
inertia parameters (φ, φ∗). Moreover, the parameters that govern the degree of
openness ( ωH , ωF , ω∗H , ω∗F , ρ) will also affect the relative price dynamics.11
Inflation rates respond differently to shocks originating at home and abroad.
A shock originated at home translates quicker to inflation the higher the elasticity
of substitution faced by the producer (θ), the lower the cost of adjusting prices at
home (φ) and the higher the home consumption bias, i.e. the lower the openness
(ωFωH ) and the cross-country substitutability of consumption goods. If the shock is
10The closed economy case can be easily recovered (for the domestic country) making τ = 1
(ωF = 0),
bπt = βEbπt+1 + (θ − 1)φπ¯2 (σbct + (α− 1)byt + αbvt)
where σbct + (α− 1)byt + αbvt represents the real marginal cost.
11It is assumed that the steady state inflation rate π¯ is the same in both economies.
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originated abroad its effect is larger the higher the degree of openness, the higher
the elasticity of substitution ( 1
1−ρ) and the lower price inertia abroad (φ
∗).
Even shocks that are common to domestic and foreign real marginal costs,
in particular innovations to the common monetary policy, may cause disparities
in the inflation rates if the degree of market competition, of price inertia or of
openness differ across countries. Inflation differentials will be larger (in absolute
value |bπt − bπ∗t |) the larger the gap between θ and θ∗ and between φ and φ∗.
2.4. Discussion of alternative price setting mechanisms
Since the different inflation response across markets to common or idiosyncratic
shocks is a key feature of our approach, the choice of the price setting mechanism
is not only a matter of analytical convenience. Although the above dynamic
specification of inflation is common to the new Keynesian Phillips curve in an
open economy setting (e.g., Galí and Monacelli, 1999), the fact that the slope of
the Phillips curve is an increasing function of the elasticity of demand (θ) is not.
This feature comes out naturally in the model of convex adjustment costs. Firms
compare the opportunity cost of not adjusting the price to its optimum level
after a shock, with an increasing marginal cost of changing the level of prices.
This produces an optimal rate of adjustment that will be faster for those firms
for which profits are more sensitive to deviations from the optimal policy. This
sensitivity depends on the curvature of the profit function that is a function of the
elasticity of demand. Thus, firms operating in a highly competitive environment
will experiment a substantial opportunity cost if the price deviates from its profit
maximizing level, whereas this cost will be of second order for firms with high
monopoly power (Akerloff and Yellen, 1984; Martin, 1993).
Staggered price models, in which firms revise their prices at exogenously given
intervals, yield a rather different implication. For example, Gali, Gertler and
López-Salido (2001) and Sbordone (2002) show, under the stochastic Calvo (1983)
setup and some assumptions about technology, that the response of inflation to
exogenous shocks depends negatively on the elasticity of demand. When firms
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change prices at exogenously given points in time, the logic of the comparison
between the cost of changing and that of no changing prices does no longer apply.
When the opportunity of changing prices comes, the firm does not care about
the losses made during the period of no action; rational firms will look into the
future trying to avoid large deviations of the marginal revenue from the expected
path of the marginal cost. Thus, firms facing highly elastic demand curves will
need smaller price adjustment to bring the marginal revenue back on line with
the marginal cost, i.e. the optimal price of these firms barely changes with ex-
pected movements in the marginal cost. Conversely, other things being equal, less
competitive firms will find it optimal to proceed to a larger change in the price
level.
In fact these opposite results in alternative price setting models can be made
compatible. We must bear in mind that it is the exogeneity of the spell of price
stability by firms what is driving the implication of faster adjustment by more
ceompetitive firms. This assumption is very helpful in order to generate a tractable
dynamic equation for aggregate inflation, but is also the less satisfactory feature
of this class of models. If we remove the assumption of exogenously fixed intervals,
it might be the case that less competitive firms would proceed to change prices
more often, although less intensively, than more competitive ones, thus generating
more price inertia (Blanchard and Fischer, 1989).12
Thus, a negative correlation between market competition and price stickiness is
a fairly general implication of the literature of price inertia. The empirical evidence
is not unequivocal, but several papers find that price stickiness is lower for firms
operating in more competitive markets (see, e.g.,Carlton, 1986, Geroski, 1995,
Hall, Walsh and Yates, 2000 and Bils and Klenow, 2002). Interestingly, Carlton
(1986) goes beyond that and reports evidence of more intense but less frequent
adjustment of prices by firms operating in less competitive markets, which would
suggest that staggered pricing gives a correct but incomplete picture of the link
12Using a simple Ss model those authors show that the threshold for the exogenous shock
beyond which the firm will adjust prices is negatively related to the elasticity of demand. Thus,
more competitive firms will tend to change prices more often.
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between market structure and inflation dynamics.
3. Calibration
This section discusses the calibration of the parameters and the steady state re-
lationships that affect the coefficients of the log-linear model presented in the
Appendix. The benchmark calibration represents two average big Euro area coun-
tries, moderately open, but one economy being more competitive than the other.
We are also interested in analyzing how changes in the degree of price inertia
and in the degree of openness for one of the countries affects the results. Finally,
we parameterize the sources of fluctuations needed for the alternative conditional
exercises performed in the next section.
3.1. Price discrimination.
To calibrate the parameters related to the price discrimination mechanism we
rely on recent evidence that reports large deviations from the law of one price in
the long run despite the significant price level convergence occurred across EMU
countries, especially in the traded sector.
Goldberg and Verboven (2001) find convergence towards the law of one price
in the European car market although significant fixed effects in the convergence
equation indicate systematic price differentials across countries. Their measured
long-term price differences take values between 5 and 17 per cent and are highly
significant. Rogers (2002) also reports differences in individual items and in a
composite price level for 18 cities in all Euro area countries, and compares them to
the dispersion of the same prices across 13 US cities. These results are summarized
in Table 1 where the standard deviation across cities in US and the Euro area for
1990 and 2001 are reported. Even in a long lasting monetary union, such as the US,
price level differences persist in the long run; their evolution indicates that there
is a limit to price convergence of about 5 per cent differences in the price levels
in the traded sector. There has been a very significant price convergence during
the nineties for traded goods in the Euro area and the current price dispersion
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of 6 per cent price differences across locations is similar to the one observed for
US. Non-tradables prices are much more dispersed both in the Euro area and
especially in the US.
Table 1
Price level dispersion across locations
CPI-weighted indexes
Composite price 1990 2001
Euro Area Non-tradeables 0.15 0.12
Tradeables 0.18 0.06
US Non-tradeables 0.31 0.40
Tradeables 0.04 0.05
Source: Rogers (2002), Figures 1 and 2.
In our model, the elasticities of substitution across varieties sold in each coun-
try (θ, θ∗) determine the steady state markups ( θθ−1 and
θ∗
θ∗−1 , respectively), and
hence the size of price level differences in the long run. If these elasticities are
different, home producers will markup differently those products sold at home and
abroad
Ã
P ∗H
PH
!
=
θ∗
θ∗−1
θ
θ−1
6= 1 (3.1)
and the same will hold for
µ
P ∗F
PF
¶
. We consider the domestic country as the most
competitive one, with a markup of 1.1 (i.e. a net markup of 10 per cent), lower
than that in the foreign country which is calibrated to be 15 per cent in line with
Basu and Fernald’s (1997) evidence. These values imply a conservative estimation
of the importance of markup differences across European markets. The markup
ratio of 15 to 10 per cent implies a permanent price level differential of around
4.5 per cent, slighthly lower than the estimations in Rogers (2002) for European
tradeable goods and close to the lower bound of car price differences in Europe
reported by Goldberg and Verboven (2001).
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3.2. Preferences
The preference parameters are taken from the business cycle literature. The an-
nual discount factor β is 0.99 to set an annual real interest rate of 3 per cent. The
ratio ψ/r is set to 10−3 to approximate the cost of intermediation in the financial
markets, as in Benigno (2001).
The risk aversion parameter, σ, is 2. The output elasticity parameter α (equa-
tion 2.2) has a correspondence with the parameters in a decentralized setup with
separable consumption-labor preferences and a decreasing returns to labor pro-
duction function. If αL is the labor share and χ is the inverse of the labor supply
elasticity then α = (1+χ)αL . Taking the average labor share in the Euro area of
0.75 and assuming a value for the labor supply elasticity of 1/χ = 0.2, we ob-
tain a calibrated value for α of 8.13 Since the chosen labor supply elasticity is
more consistent with micro evidence, we also perform sensitivity analysis on the
model simulations using a larger value (1/χ = 1), more according with macro
calibrations.
3.3. Openness
The following steady state equations are derived from the equations describing
the equilibrium:
1 =
cH
y
+
c∗H
y
(3.2)
"Ã
PF
PH
!
ωH
ωF
#1/(1−ρ)
=
cH
cF
(3.3)
Table 2 shows the most relevant ratios for each EMU country in the period 1991-
2001 that are used to calibrate the above expressions.14
13The average labor shares in the 1991-2000 period are 0.79 for Germany, 0.70 for France and
Italy and 0.76 for Spain.
14The source is Eurostat annual national accounts. Data availability has forced us to take a
shorter sample size starting in 1995 for Greece. The consumption of home produced goods, cH ,
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Table 2
Average ratios across Euro area countries: 1991-2001
cH
cF
cH
y
³
PF
PH
´
Belgium 0.47 0.32 1.18
Germany 2.84 0.74 1.03
Greece 2.81 0.73 0.96
Spain 3.30 0.76 0.99
France 3.54 0.78 1.04
Ireland 0.35 0.26 0.69
Italy 3.17 0.76 0.90
Netherlands 0.85 0.46 1.05
Austria 1.50 0.60 1.05
Portugal 1.86 0.65 1.03
Finland 2.12 0.68 0.95
We have calibrated our economies to represent the average big Euro area coun-
try such as Germany, France, Italy or Spain. Thus, we take as benchmark calibra-
tion cH
cF
= 3 and cH
y
= 0.75 representing a moderately open economy. Notice that
this calibration would hold for large Euro area countries but also for some small
ones (i.e. Greece). The parameters that measure the share of home produced
goods and imports in total consumption, ωH and ωF , respectively, are calibrated
using the expression (3.3) and assuming that
³
PF
PH
´
= 1. The last column in Table
2 indicates that actual deviations of this ratio from the assumed parity have been
minimal. The elasticity of substitution ε = 1
1−ρ is fixed to 1.5, the value used by
Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994). We shall also consider different values of ρ,
ranging from a unit elasticity (ρ ' 0) to an elasticity ε = 4 (ρ = 0.75).
We assume that the steady state nominal net asset position for each country,
A, is zero and that both countries have the same size ( P
P
∗
c
c∗ = 1). Thus, net
is approximated by the sum of private and government final consumption expenditure plus gross
fixed capital formation and changes in inventories minus imports of goods and services. The
ratio cHcF is measured by the average share over the period of consumption of domestic goods to
imports.
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exports are zero at the steady state,Ã
P ∗H
PF
!
=
cF
c∗H
(3.4)
Sensitivity exercises are carried out in Section 4 in order to explore the inci-
dence of allowing for different degree of openness and size across countries.
3.4. Nominal stickiness and the monetary policy rule
The price inertia parameters φ and φ∗ have been set to 100 to generate a slope of
the Phillips curve, τ(θ−1)φπ¯2 , equal to 0.10. A 10 per cent response of inflation to a
unit change in the real marginal cost corresponds to the estimations in Benigno
and López-Salido (2002) for France and Germany. We also perform sensitivity
analysis on this parameter consistently with the estimates of the Phillips curve
for other European countries.
The monetary policy rule displays interest rate smoothing (ρr = 0.8), no out-
put response and the inflation response coefficient is ρπ = 1.5. That parameteriza-
tion of the Taylor rule is consistent with recent Euro area estimates (e.g. Andrés,
López-Salido and Vallés, 2001).
3.5. Shocks
Finally, we analyze the magnitude of the inflation differentials and the volatility of
the relative prices under a common (monetary policy) shock and two asymmetric
shocks: a positive foreign preference or demand shock and a negative foreign
supply shock.
We assume that the asymmetric shocks follow AR(1) processes with persistence
parameter 0.9. The sizes of the three shocks have been calibrated to reproduce
in each case the volatility of output observed on average for the big Euro area
countries, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, i.e. std(y) = 0.8 (see Table 3 in
the next section). A standard deviation of 0.7 per cent in the monetary policy
shock generates a volatility of 0.8 per cent in domestic output, while the standard
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deviation of the foreign demand and supply shocks have been calibrated to 7.2
and 0.5 per cent, respectively, to generate the same standard deviation of foreign
output.
4. Simulation Results
In this section we make a quantitative assessment of the changes in relative prices
predicted by the model under different shocks, as well as the sensitivity of those
predictions to the key parameters that govern the dynamics of inflation. We
compute the response of output and prices to a given shock, either symmetric or
asymmetric, focusing on the short run response of the inflation differential between
the two countries. We also compute two other measures of price dispersion: first,
the the standard deviation of the inflation response across countries15; second, the
business cycle volatility of the relative consumption-based national price indexes
measured with the ratio of the standard deviation of relative prices to the standard
deviation of one country’s output.
4.1. Monetary policy shocks
Figure 2 depicts the pattern of responses of the main variables to a common
monetary policy shock. The calibrated shock generates an unexpected rise of the
nominal interest rate of 38 basis points, which is similar to the results obtained
in recent VAR literature for the Euro area (see Peersman and Smets, 2001). The
two lines represent the impulse responses for the case of symmetric economies
with equal demand elasticities consistent with a 10 per cent steady state markup
(solid line) and for the asymmetric case in which the domestic economy has higher
market competition than the foreign one (benchmark case: dashed line). In all
cases, the presence of price stickiness leads to a temporary fall in output followed
by a gradual recovery to the baseline level that takes about a year and a half.
The response of output in both countries is similar. The response of prices is
15Duarte and Wolman (2002) also discuss the volatility of the inflation differentials within the
EMU under asymmetric fiscal and productivity shocks.
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different, though, in the case of different demand elasticities: because of lower
price elasticity in the less competitive (foreign) economy, the price set by the
producers of both domestic goods (P ∗H) and of foreign goods (P
∗
F ) sold in that
economy responds less to marginal costs. Hence, foreign inflation falls less than
the domestic one. The negative inflation differential (π− π∗) of 28 basis points is
substantial but it vanishes rather quickly.16 When the simulation of the monetary
policy shock is done with the more standard Taylor rule parameters (i.e. we add a
response to the output gap in both countries of 0.5 in equation (2.8)) we generate
a slightly lower fall in output and inflation in both countries but the inflation
differential is very similar. Obviously, no inflation differential is generated in the
symmetric case.
Both, the inflation differential as well as the implied inflation dispersion (mea-
sured by the standard deviation) statistics are also reported in Table 3. In the
benchmark case, this common shock generates an standard deviation of 0.20 per-
cent whereas the actual standard deviation of the HICP is 1 percent (Figure 1).17
Therefore these differences in the degree of competition may explain up to one
fourth of the actual inflation dispersion.
Figure 3A shows the size of this impact inflation differential for alternative
values of the foreign demand elasticity (while keeping domestic markup at the
10 per cent benchmark value). The starting point is the symmetric case, where
the relative demand elasticity is 1. As expected, the difference in the response of
the two national inflation rates to the common shock becomes larger as the less
competitive country becomes lesser so (with smaller demand elasticity θ∗) since
this leads to an even milder response of the two components of the foreign country
consumer price index. As the relative elasticity θθ∗ increases, corresponding to an
increase in the foreign country markup from 10 to 30 per cent, the steady-state
price level differential rises from 4.5 to 18 per cent. As the heterogeneity across
16Note that there is no attempt in the model to account for realistic inflation inertia. The
persistence of such differential could be increased by e.g. introducing explicitly a lagged inflation
term in the Phillips curve in the spirit of the hybrid new Keynesian Phillips curves.
17That number would be 0.8 if we were considering just the industrial goods without energy
in the four biggest euro area economies, so that the model experiment is more comparable.
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economies gets larger, so does the impact inflation differential that goes up to 70
basis points, in response to the aggregate shock. The persistence of such inflation
differential increases also as the difference in the degree of market competition
across countries increases, but to a far lesser extent.
Table 3
Sensitivity Analysis Under Alternative Shocks: Impact responses
Monetary Asym. Demand Asym. Supply
π Diff std(π,π∗) π Diff std(π,π∗) π Diff std(π,π∗)
Symmetric (1) 0 0 −0.42 0.29 −0.11 0.07
Benchmark (2) −0.28 0.20 −0.16 0.12 −0.07 0.05
Sensitivity
Competition:
θ < θ∗ (3) 2.30 1.63 −2.07 1.46 −0.32 0.23
θ > θ∗ (4) −0.70 0.50 0.24 0.16 −0.01 0.01
Price Inertia:
φ∗ = 70.5 −0.25 0.18 −0.21 0.15 −0.16 0.31
φ∗ = 167 −0.33 0.23 −0.11 0.07 −0.01 0.01
Substitution:
Lower (ε ' 1) −0.28 0.20 −0.26 0.18 −0.10 0.07
Higher (ε = 4) −0.29 0.21 0.03 0.02 −0.02 0.01
Openness:
High ωFωH=1 −0.30 0.21 0.18 0.13 −0.01 0.01
(1) θ = θ∗ = 11, φ,φ∗=100, ε=1.5, ωFωH =
ω∗H
ω∗F
=0.48, P
∗
P
c∗
c =1
(2) As in (1) except for θ = 11 > θ∗ = 7.6
(3) As in (2) except for θ = 11 < θ∗ = 91.9
(4) As in (2) except for θ = 11 > θ∗ = 4.3
Differential inflation responses are also affected by the degree of price rigidity
faced by each producer. To quantify his effect we have kept the domestic price
inertia at the benchmark value, i.e. φ = 100, while allowing the less competitive
foreign economy to vary from very low to fairly high price inertia (φ∗ from 50 to
200) as shown in Figure 3B. Higher price inertia in the more competitive domestic
economy reduces the impact response of prices relative to that in the other country,
thus generating smaller negative inflation differentials, while the opposite is true
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to the right of the benchmark value of φ
∗
φ = 1, where the less competitive foreign
economy is also the more sticky. Figure 3B also shows that inflation differentials
induced by common shocks are much less sensitive to variations in relative price
inertia than they are to variations in the relative degree of competition.
We now look at a specific business cycle feature of the EMU and analyze how
the model can reproduce it. Once we consider a monetary union and leave fixed
the nominal exchange rate, the volatility of the relative prices becomes a relevant
business cycle statistic. Table 4 shows the volatility of the cyclical component of
the relative price observed for different EMU countries with respect to Germany.18
We find that the relative price volatility is lower than the volatility of output
(except in Italy). The average value of the ratio between these two magnitudes
for the reported EMU countries is 0.62, but reaches 0.75 for the average of the
main EMU economies (Spain, Germany, Italy and France). In a similar work,
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2001) report a much larger real exchange rate
volatility of US with respect to Europe (4.5 times the volatility of US GDP for
the period 1973-2000), that is mostly caused by nominal exchange rate fluctuations
in the period. We acknowledge that during the nineties, although the Euro area
countries belonged to the EMS, the exchange rate policies and the independent
monetary policies may have affected those numbers, and therefore they are not
fully comparable to the ones predicted by the model
18The cyclical components have been obtained applying the Baxter-King filter to the logs of
the original series. The source of the data is the Quarterly National Accounts from Eurostat.
All variables are converted into Euro equivalents. The maximum sample period available for
Germany, and hence for the comparisons with that country is 1991q1-2001q4. Ireland has been
excluded due to lack of data. Prices are measured by the GDP deflator.
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Table 4
Business cycle fluctuations
Euro area (1991-2001)
std(y) std(P/PGE) std(P/P
GE )
std(y)
Belgium 1.07% 0.39% 0.36
Germany 0.69% 0 0
Greece 0.93% 0.66% 0.56
Spain 1.04% 0.60% 0.57
France 0.76% 0.45% 0.43
Italy 0.79% 0.99% 1.26
Netherlands 0.84% 0.57% 0.67
Austria 0.77% 0.48% 0.63
Finland 1.96% 1.08% 0.55
The value of std(P/P
∗)
std(y∗) generated by the model for the benchmark parameteriza-
tion when the common monetary policy shocks are the only source of fluctuations
is 0.73, close to the one observed for the average big Euro area country in the
last decade. Figure 4 shows how the volatility of relative prices after a common
shock changes as we change the degree of competition in the foreign economy.
As expected, the more different the demand elasticities in the two countries the
more volatile the relative prices. As discussed earlier, lower competition makes
foreign producer prices less sensitive to a contractionary monetary policy shock,
thus increasing the difference between the price responses in the two countries.
In fact, when both countries are equally competitive, the relative prices do not
change after the common shock.
Figure 4 also shows that the sensitivity to the relative demad elasticity across
countries is smaller the higher the level of price inertia. For degrees of price
inertia that are common across EMU countries, the picture resembles very much
the benchmark case (solid line), and significant discrepancies only arise for very
large differences in the degree of market competition. Allowing for more flexible
prices in the foreign country like the estimated for The Netherlands (φ∗ = 70.5)
increases the differences in price reactions and therefore causes a higher volatility
of relative prices after a common shock. The opposite occurs when one of the
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countries has more price inertia like the estimated for Spain (φ∗ = 167), but it
can be seen that in this latter case, the sensitivity of the relative prices volatility
to the markup differential is smaller. This is even more clearly seen when one
of the countries has a very high price inertia such as the one estimated for Italy
(φ∗ = 10000). The volatility of relative prices becomes substantially different and
very insensitive to differences in the degree of competition.
In sum, small differences in the price elasticity of demand across countries are
sufficient to generate the amount of cross-country relative price volatility observed
in the data even for shocks that are common to both countries.19 Consistently
with what we found in the inflation differential impulse responses, the sensitivity
of relative price fluctuations to a reasonable range of different price stickiness
across countries is smaller than to a moderate range of demand elasticities ratios.
These results are sensitive to some parameters of the model, especially the
labor supply elasticity, that is measured with a high degree of uncertainty. We have
experimented with a value of 1/χ = 1, more according with macro calibrations,
and obtained that the model generates lower real marginal cost volatility and
therefore lower variability of output and prices in both economies. In particular,
for this parameterization the inflation differential becomes −0.16 and the relative
price volatility 0.41. Thus, under this alternative parameterization we explain a
slightly lower proportion of the observed traded goods inflation variability in the
Euro area.
4.2. Asymmetric real demand and supply shocks
Figure 5 depicts the impulse responses, under the benchmark calibration, to a
positive demand shock originated in the less competitive (foreign) economy that
generates a negative inflation differential of 16 basis points on impact. The shock
to real demand in the foreign country affects positively domestic inflation: on the
one hand imported goods prices are higher and on the other foreign demand rises
19An even smaller difference would be sufficient to match the relative price volatility if we
were trying to match the volatility of the relative consumption deflator (0.48 times consumption
volatility on average for the main EMU economies) rather than that of the GDP deflator.
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as well. The monetary policy rule reacts to this rise in inflation by increasing
nominal interest rates, making most of the effects of the positive shock disappear
after two years.
The relative inflation response also varies with the differences in market com-
petition across countries, as shown in Table 3. As competition increases in the
foreign economy, prices in that economy react more on impact after the demand
shock and therefore the negative inflation differential gets higher (−2.07). On the
contrary, as the markup in the foreign economy increases (up to 30 per cent) due
to a lower demand elasticity, its inflation response becomes smaller, thus revert-
ing the inflation differential generated on impact (0.24). The table also shows the
sensitivity of this impact response to changes in the degree of price stickiness. The
variation in the inflation differential is now more pronounced than it was in the
case of the symmetric shock. The higher the price inertia in the country suffering
the shock the smaller the reaction of its prices and hence the smaller the inflation
differential observed.
Figure 6 depicts the impulse responses under the benchmark parameterization
to an unanticipated negative technology shock in the less competitive foreign
country. In this case the negative foreign supply shock affects positively domestic
inflation through higher import prices, but it lowers foreign demand of domestic
goods which contributes negatively to home inflation πˆt. The overall effect is a
small rise on domestic inflation. Domestic inflation rises less than foreign inflation
yielding a negative inflation differential, that is also sensitive to the relative degree
of competition and to relative price inertia. Table 3 shows that the less competitive
the country suffering the shock (lower price elasticity θ∗) and the higher its price
inertia, the lower the inflation reaction in that country and thus the lower the
inflation differential generated as a consequence of the shock.
4.3. Sensitivity to the degree of substitution and of openness
Price dynamics are also affected by the elasticity of substitution between domestic
and foreign goods (ε = 1
1−ρ) as well as by the degree of openness (
ωF
ωH ). The effect
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of changes in that elasticity depends on the nature of the shocks. In the case
of a common shock, like a monetary policy shock, the effect of a change in the
elasticity of substitution is insignificant. But in presence of a regional shock, the
higher the elasticity of substitution, the lower the relative inflation differential.
Quantitatively, this is a very relevant parameter: as shown in Table 3, a change in
the elasticity of substitution, from 1 to 4, makes the inflation differential generated
on impact almost to vanish by an asymmetric demand or supply shock.
Our previous results correspond to a calibration representing two EMU coun-
tries that are equally open. In the benchmark model, the ratio of foreign to home
goods in consumption ωFωH is calibrated to 0.48 which represents a 25 per cent of im-
ports in the aggregate consumption bundle and corresponds to the average value
observed during the nineties for the main Euro area countries. But there are a
number of other countries with a significantly higher share of imports. Our model
can be modified to analyze the implications of cross country differences in the de-
gree of openness (or home bias in consumption). To that end we parametrize the
more competitive domestic economy also as the more open onewith ratios similar
to those of The Netherlands (see Table 2), ωFωH = 1 and
cH
y
= 0.50, corresponding
to a 50 per cent of imported goods, whereas the less competitive foreign economy
keeps the benchmark parameterization and becomes the less open.20
Table 3 summarizes the effect that changes in openness have on the impact
inflation differential. This impact response is not significantly altered under an
unexpected rise in nominal interest rates. This is not surprising since symmet-
ric shocks affect both bdt and bd∗t in a similar way and hence their effect on the
inflation rates is roughly independent on the value of ωFωH . Nevertheless, we do
find significant changes in presence of regional demand or supply shocks. Under
an asymmetric demand shock the inflation differential goes from −16 to 18 basis
points. The explanation hinges on the fact that as the economy becomes more
open output and inflation respond more to foreign shocks. To the extent that
domestic inflation may rise more than that of the country suffering the shock, a
20The relative size of the two countries is modified accordingly, so that the balance of payments
equilibrium is satisfied.
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positive impact inflation differential can be generated.
Similarly, in presence of a negative supply shock in the foreign economy the
transmission to the domestic country is more significant the more open is that
economy. Now the weight of import prices is higher than in the benchmark case,
causing a bigger rise in domestic inflation. Domestic inflation responds almost
twice as much and therefore produces a very low inflation differential.
5. Concluding remarks
What explains temporary inflation differentials in monetary unions? This pa-
per goes half of the way to answer this question. In particular we focus on the
determinants of those inflation differentials that are not associated with long run
processes of productivity catching-up and/or price level convergence. Even within
long existing monetary unions there is a significant amount of price variability
across countries at business cycle frequencies. Part of the explanation relies on
asymmetric or regional shocks. But even shocks of this kind cannot reproduce the
observed dispersion of inflation rates unless we assume that countries within the
union differ in some crucial features that govern the way markets adjust. These
differences may also account for inflation differentials in response to symmetric
shocks, like the innovations to the common monetary policy instrument.
This paper parameterizes a two-country monetary union in which different
economic structures in the two countries generate permanent price level differences
and temporary inflation differentials. These structural asymmetries consist on
cross-country heterogeneity in the degree of competition in the goods markets,
which cause producers to discriminate prices, different price inertia and different
degrees of openness or preference for foreign goods in consumption. Once we allow
for moderate cross-country variations in the degree of nominal and real rigidities,
we are able to generate sizeable inflation differentials in a model calibrated to
match the most salient long run features of the average big EMU economies.
In presence of common shocks, the relative degree of market competition turns
out to be a crucial parameter governing the relative price responses. Small devia-
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tions on the degree of competition that account for 5 per cent long run price level
difference across countries may be responsible for temporary inflation differentials
of up to 28 basis points when the economy is subject to a common monetary
policy shock. Small differences in the degree of nominal inertia also contribute to
generate substantial inflation differentials, although the relevance of this channel
is quantitatively less important. Not surprisingly, in presence of regional (asym-
metric) shocks, also the elasticity of substitution between home produced and
imported goods and the degree of openness play a major role to produce realistic
values of the main statistics of interest.
We have focused on short-term measures of inflation like impact responses or
countries’ dispersion of these responses. But these inflation differentials could
last longer.They can be generated not only by ad-hoc persistent sources of fluc-
tuations or ad-hoc inflation inertia, but also by endogenous mechanisms like the
consideration of capital accumulation or the existence of real frictions (e.g. habit
formation or investment adjustment costs). Moreover, the differences in countries’
competitiveness and the degree of openness may be completed with other struc-
tural differences (e.g. taxation or labour costs) that are known to be relevant in
the context of the EMU. We leave the interaction of these elements for further
research.
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Appendix
The equilibrium (in log-linear form) is represented by the following system of
23 equations and 23 endogenous variables: bct, bcH,t, bcF,t, bc∗t , bc∗F,t, bc∗H,t, bPt, bPH,t, bPF,t,bPt, bP ∗H,t, bP ∗F,t, byt, byH,t, by∗H,t, by∗t , by∗F,t, byF,t, at, a∗t , brt, bπt, bπ∗t .
bPF,t − bPH,t = (1− ρ) (bcH,t − bcF,t) (A1)
bct = Etbct+1 − 1σ
Ãbrt −Etbπt+1 −
Ã
ψ
r
!
at
!
+
1
σ (
bst −Etbst+1) (A2)
bPH,t = 1
1 + β
bPH,t−1 + β
1 + βEt
bPH,t+1
+
µH
1 + β [(α− 1)
byt − (1− σ)bct + bcH,t + αbvt] (A3)
bP ∗H,t = 11 + β + µ∗H bP ∗H,t−1 +
β
1 + β + µ∗H
Et bP ∗H,t+1 + µ∗H1 + β + µ∗H bPH,t
+
µ∗H
1 + β + µ∗H
h
(α− 1)byt − (1− σ)bct + bcH,t + αbvt + ( bPHt − bP ∗Hti (A4)
bct = ωH µcH
c
¶ρ
(bcH,t) + ωF µcF
c
¶ρ
(bcF,t) (A5)
byt =
Ã
yH
y
! byH,t +
Ã
y∗H
y
! by∗H,t (A6)
bPt = (ωH)( 11−ρ )
Ã
PH
P
!( ρρ−1) ³ bPH,t´+ (ωF )( 11−ρ )
Ã
PF
P
!( ρρ−1) ³ bPF,t´ (A7)
bπt = bPt − bPt−1 (A8)
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β
Ã
P ∗H
P
!
c∗H
c
( bP ∗H,t + bc∗H,t − bPF,t − bcF,t) + at−1 = βat (A9)
bP ∗F,t − bP ∗H,t = (1− ρ) ³bc∗H,t − bc∗F,t´ (A10)
bc∗t = Etbc∗t+1 − 1σ
Ãbrt − bπ∗t+1 −
Ã
ψ
r
!
a∗t
!
+
1
σ
³bs∗t −Etbs∗t+1´ (A11)
bP ∗F,t = 11 + β bP ∗F,t−1 + β1 + βEt bP ∗F,t+1
+
µ∗F
1 + β
h
(α− 1)by∗t − (1− σ)bc∗t + bc∗F,t + αbv∗t i (A12)
bPF,t = 1
1 + β + µF
bPF,t−1 + β
1 + β + µF
Et bPF,t+1 + µF
1 + β + µF
bP ∗F,t
+
µF
1 + β + µF
h
(α− 1)by∗t − (1− σ)bc∗t + bc∗F,t + αbv∗t + ³ bP ∗Ft − bPFt´i (A13)
bc∗t = ω∗H µc∗Hc∗
¶ρ ³bc∗H,t´+ ω∗F µc∗Fc∗
¶ρ ³bc∗F,t´ (A14)
by∗t =
Ã
yF
y∗
! byF,t +
Ã
y∗F
y∗
! by∗F,t (A15)
bP ∗t = (ω∗H)( 11−ρ )
Ã
P ∗H
P ∗
!( ρρ−1) ³ bP ∗H,t´+ (ω∗F )( 11−ρ )
Ã
P ∗F
P ∗
!( ρρ−1) ³ bP ∗F,t´ (A16)
bπ∗t = bP ∗t − bP ∗t−1 (A17)
a∗t
Ã
P ∗
P
!
c∗
c
+ at = 0 (A18)
bcH,t = byH,t (A19)
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bc∗H,t = by∗H,t (A20)
bcF,t = byF,t (A21)
bc∗F,t = by∗F,t (A22)
brt = ρrbrt−1 + (1− ρr)ρπ 12(bπt + bπ∗t ) + zr,t (A23)
where µH =
(θ−1)
φπ¯2 ; µ
∗
H =
(θ∗−1)
φπ¯2 ; µ
∗
F =
(θ∗−1)
φ∗π¯2 ; µF =
(θ−1)
φ∗π¯2 .
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FIGURE 1 
MEASURES OF HICP INFLATION DISPERSION ACROSS EURO AREA COUNTRIES 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
Note: Standard deviation of annual rates of inflation in percentage points. The weights for each 
country are the share of the constant GDP at market prices (PPP) for 1995.   
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FIGURE 2 
 
RESPONSES TO A CONTRACTIONARY MONETARY POLICY SHOCK 
Symmetric case (solid line), benchmark (dashed line) 
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FIGURE 3 
 
INFLATION DIFFERENTIAL 
 IMPACT EFFECT UNDER A CONTRACTIONARY MONETARY POLICY  SHOCK  
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FIGURE 4 
 
VOLATILITY OF RELATIVE PRICES  
UNDER A CONTRACTIONARY MONETARY POLICY  SHOCK  
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FIGURE 5 
 
     RESPONSES TO AN ASYMMETRIC POSITIVE DEMAND SHOCK (F COUNTRY) 
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FIGURE 6 
 
     RESPONSES TO AN ASYMMETRIC NEGATIVE SUPPLY SHOCK  (F COUNTRY) 
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